Children at three different ages made judgments of physically presented (perceptual estimation) or symbolically represented (memorial estimation) rectangles. Height and width were integrated according to different, age-dependent algebraic rules. Memorial data obeyed the same integration rules that operated in the original perceptual judgments even when younger children and older children used completely different combination models. Valuation operations were the same in perception and memory for the youngest group (6-year-olds) but became discriminably different at older ages (for the 8-and 10-year olds). Three additional experiments on judgments of volume, Liquid quantity, and visual length yielded strong cross, validation support for the general invariance claim (with respect to integration rule theory) but less strong support for the specific invariance claim (with respect to valuation function for the 6-year-old subjects). Results are interpreted as demonstrating lawful and long-enduring ecological constraints on internal representation.
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The various functional similarities between memorial and perceptual processes are well recognized in current cognitive research (J. R. Anderson, 1980; Kosslyn, 1975 Kosslyn, , 1978 Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979; Moyer & Dumais, 1978; Paivio, 1975 Paivio, , 1978 Shepard & Podgnmy, 1978) . For example, when subjects are asked to compare the sizes of two objects from memory, their reaction times are reciprocal to the differenees in their subjective size ratings (Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975; Kerst & Howard, 1977; Moyer, 1973; Moyer & Bayer, 1976) . This memorial relation mirrors the perceptual relation, where reaction time is inversely related to stimulus difference (e.g., Curtis, Paulos, & Rule, 1973; Johnson, 1939 ; see also Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954) . The now famous imagery tasks of mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) , mental paper folding (Shepard & Feng, 1972) , mental walk (Kosslyn, Bail, & Reiser, 1978) , and mental clock reading (Paivio, 1978) , to name but a few, all support the notion of analog, quasiperceptual internal representations. These and similar results led Shepard to speak of a "second-order isomorphism" between perceptual and memorial representation (Shepard & Chipman, 1970 ; see also Kosslyn et ai., 1979) and Moyer (1973) to suggest the existence of an "internal psychephysical judgment."
Less well established, however, are the exact quantitative relations between pairs of perceptual and memorial response sets. Most of the relevant studies used only a memory task (see reviews in cognitive psychology by J. R. Anderson, 1980; Neisser, 1967; and Shepard, 1984;  and works in mental imagery in particular by Algom & Lewin, 1976 Algom & Singer, 1985; Kosslyn, 1980; Paivio, 1971 Paivio, , 1975 and Singer, 1966, We thank Lior Cohen-Raz for helpful discussions on earlier drafts of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Daniel Algom, who is now at the John B. Pierce Foundation Laboratory, 290 Congress Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut 06519. 1973 Connecticut 06519. , 1978 Connecticut 06519. , 1982 . Thus, models relating memory performance to parallel perceptual performance primarily involved acrossstudy comparisons. In addition, large portions of existing data have been gathered with discrete stimulus components (using methods such as paired comparisons), which allow for the determination of ordinal relations only (but see Moyer & Bayer, 1976) .
Memory Psychophysics
A relatively new, alternative approach allows for independent estimates of parameters with continuous variables. Instead of using ordinal paired comparisons (e.g., to decide which of two objects is bigger), each stimulus of a relatively large set (usually representing different values on a stimulus dimension) is presented for judgment on an unbounded scale, either perceptually or from memory. The procedure involves the parallel, though separate, examination of the relations between perceptual stimulus magnitude and memory-based magnitude judgments and between stimulus magnitude and regular judgments. Standard psychophysical methods and analyses can be used with both types of judgment, the only procedural difference being that stimuli are physically presented in one case, and symbolically represented (i.e., retrieved from memory) in the other. Moyer, Bradley, Sorensen, Whiting, and Mansfield (1978) had separate groups of subjects estimate the size of perceived or of remembered one-, two-, and three-dimensional objects. Subjects participating in the memory condition were told to image (rather than view) each stimulus as its preleamed name was called out, and then to assign numbers in accord with standard magnitude estimation instructions (e.g., Marks, 1974; Stevens, 1975) . Perceptual as well as memorial magnitude estimations were well fit by power functions, but the exponent was reliably smaller for the memory-based judgments. For example, perceived area related to physical area by a power function with an exponent of 0.643, whereas memorial estimations of the same stimuli yielded a function with an exponent of 0.463. Kerst and Howard (1978) used the same procedures for judgments of visual area and length and arrived at essentially the same results: Power functions provided good fit to both perceptual and memorial estimates, with a more attenuated exponent characterizing the memory data.
Theories of Memory-Based Magnitude Judgments
The finding of a power relation for memory-based judgments implies that remembered stimuli map onto physical values the same functional way as perceived stimuli do. Two different hypotheses have been suggested to account for the parameter difference finding, namely, the smaller exponent for memorial judgments.
According to the reperceptual hypothesis (Kerst & Howard, 1978; , perception and memory perform identical transformations on the input data. Following Stevens (e.g., 1975 ), a simple two-parameter power function describes how perceptual magnitude increases with physical magnitude (at least for prothetic sensory continua). Thus,
where R is a magnitude judgment, S stands for an actual physical magnitude, and a and b are constants. The exponent is given by b, whereas a is an arbitrarily determined measurement modulus. For memory, judgment is again a power function of the relevant input with the same value of exponent. However, the "adequate stimulus" (Boring, 1942) for memory-based estimates is the previously determined perceptual scale value (rather than the original physical value). Therefore,
where M is an appropriate memorial judgment, and a' has the same meaning as a in Equation 1. Substituting for R yields
where A is the new scaling factor. The reperceptual hypothesis predicts a square relation between a given pair of perceptual and memorial power function exponents. An interesting corollary of this result relates to the prescribed form of the relevant memory-percept function. Plotting the memorial estimates against the perceptual estimates for a given set of stimuli should again yield a power function with an exponent equal to that characterizing the original perceptual transform. Thus,
where A' is the appropriate scaling constant. Equation 4 depicts a valuable relation, one which rests wholly within the subjective psychological realm. The alternative formulation, labeled uncertainty hypothesis, has not, as yet, been stated in formal terms. According to one version (Kerst & Howard, 1978 ) subjects experience greater uncertainty-if not confusion--in the memory condition, which causes them to be more conservative in their magnitude judgments. The resulting response constriction reduces the magnitude of the memorial power function exponent. Another version (Algom, Wolf, & Bergman, 1985) holds that it is the stimulus dimension that undergoes changes under the rather uncertain memory-based judgment condition. A widening of the memorial dynamic response range (R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, , 1973 causes an appropriate decrease in the power function exponent. In our version, the attenuated memory exponent simply constitutes a special case of the inverse relation existing between dynamic response range and power function exponent (R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, , 1973 .
Application of the Information Integration Approach to Memory Content
Although memory psychophysics and mental imagery studies have provided useful cognitive information, they have a substantial limitation. Virtually all previous work in memory psychophysics is based on unifactor stimulus designs in conjunction with direct scaling techniques for obtaining the response. However, the validity of such techniques relies on the questionable assumption that putative numerical ratios reflect actual ratios of subjective scale values (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984; N. H. Anderson, 1970 N. H. Anderson, , 1974 N. H. Anderson, , 1981 N. H. Anderson, , 1982 Curtis, Attneave & Harrington, 1968; Garner, 1954; Torgerson, 1961 ) . Aside from the fundamental validation problem, unifactorial studies cannot deal with the organization principles in memory being examined in current cognitive research.
By contrast, the approach advocated over the past several years by N. H. Anderson (e.g., 1970 Anderson (e.g., , 1981 Anderson (e.g., , 1982 , designated functional measurements, emphasizes stimulus integration and the specific form of concatenation of subjective components into a unitary overt response. In addition, uncovering the correct metric structure that underlies the overt judgments provides the needed logical base to validate these judgments (N. H. Anderson, 1981 Anderson, , 1982 . Although most successful applications of functional measurement have been made in what might be called perceptual phenomenology (see N. H. Anderson, 1981 , for a systematic survey of the contribution of functional measurement methods throughout different domains in psychology), nothing inherent to it prevents its application to memory. Only by recognizing the full system characteristics of memory can we understand the primary concerns of integration rule and synthesis.
Recently, we used functional measurement methodology to study memorial interactions. Separate groups of observers estimated the area of perceived or of remembered rectangles. A multiplicative Area = Height • Width composition rule underlay all perceptual judgments of area (for similar results with adults or children of 11 years and over, see N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; N. H. Anderson & Weiss, 1971; Leon, 1982; Verge & Bogartz, 1978; Wilkening, 1979) . The crucial finding of our study, however, was the reappearance of the normative Height x Width pattern in memorial estimates of area. Subjects used the same cognitive algebra in judgments of area when those judgments were based on imaginary constructs.
Besides allowing specification of the particular integration rule used when people combine information from different stimulus components, the functional model contains the scale--the psychophysical function--as its natural derivative. Therefore, we were able to derive respective pairs of validated perceptual and memorial psychophysical functions and to contrast them explicitly. We found, in accord with both the reperceptual and the uncertainty hypotheses, that the relation between perceived and actual area as well as the relation between remembered and actual area could be described by a compressive power function, with the exponent being reliably smaller for remembered than for perceived area. Taken as a whole, our results seemed to imply a principle of across-cognitive-mode integration rule invariance for a given set of stimuli in conjunction with characteristically different valuation operations for the two modes of response.
Different Integration Rules in Children's Judgments of Area
Integration rule invariance across perception and memory of given objects is a striking finding that, if supported, may prove to be a powerful organization principle in people's cognitive analyses and mental representation. Yet it derives from a tingle form of integration of stimulus components, namely the multiplicative model. used adult subjects only and the multiplying rule held for these observers under all experimental conditions. The question posed in this study is, Will the memorial integration model exactly mirror the composition form underlying the original perceptual task when the latter assumes different algebraic rules?
Children's judgments of areas of rectangles offer an especially convenient experimental tool for explicating mental representation. Recently, several studies have demonstrated a development in the integration rule characterizing children's pereeptual judgment of area (e.g., N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Leon, 1982; Wilkening, 1979) . Between the ages of 5 and 6, and 10 and 11 there is a clear transition from an initial additive, Area = Height + Width integration rule to the final, normative, Area = Height x Width model.
Besides the important developmental findings, the most striking result of these experiments is the adding pattern in the perception of area by the 6-year-olds. This model is incompatible with Piaget's (e.g., Flavell, 1963; Piaget, 1970; Piaget & Inhelder, 194 l) theory of"centration;' which claimed to characterize judgments of quantity by the preoperational child. According to Piaget, the preoperational, nonconserving child is able to attend ("to center") to only one salient aspect of the stimulus. However, the adding model implies a two-dimensional representation even for the 6-year-olds. Although these aspects are not integrated according to the veridical multiplying rule, they nevertheless obey a simple algebraic model. The ecological multiplying model appears at a later stage of development (at around the age of 10) and characterizes perception of area by adults as well.
Notwithstanding the many uncertainties about this developmental transition and its underlying psychological mechanism(s), what interests us here is the fact that children use different algebraic rules at different ages.
The principal aim of the present research was to establish the complementary integration models for remembered quantity.
Our experiments focused on perception-memory relations to examine developmental changes in the form of the integration rule underlying children's judgments of quantity. Accordingly, we had separate groups of children at different ages judge some property of a given set of stimuli either perceptually or from memory. This design enabled us to extract the respective, agedependent models of information integration for perception and memory and to contrast them explicitly. Specification of the perceptual and memorial integration models at each age allowed us to derive the relevant psychophysical functions for the two modes of cognitive generation.
Experiment 1: Judgments of Area

Method
Stimuli and design. The stimuli were chocolate-colored rectangular shapes centered on 25 x 25 cm cardboard squares. Three widths (3, 6, and 12 cm) were combined factorially with the same heights to make nine stimuli in all. A given figure was mounted on the stimulus display, approximately 60 cm from the seated subjects. To facilitate recognition of stimulus rectangles (AIgom et al., 1985) each rectangle had a solidline vertical side but a broken-line horizontal side. In addition, nine circular shapes were prepared and painted in different color each on a 6-cm diameter cardboard.
The same graphic rating scale used by Anderson and Cuneo (1978) was used to measure the child's judgments of quantity. (See N. H. Anderson & Cuneo for the various delicate details involved in applying this methodology with children.) The use of end-anchor stimuli is recommended by Anderson for rating scales, especially with young children as subjects. As a rule, these stimuli should be slightly more extreme than the experimental stimuli. The sides of the small and the large anchor stimuli (squares) were 2.4 cm and 15.0 cm, respectively. The child's judgments of quantity were made on a 20-point scale. A face with a downward curving mouth (sad) was mounted to the left of the scale, and a similar face with an upward curving mouth (happy) was mounted to the fight of tlie scale (see N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978 , for more details).
Procedure. There were two experimental conditions, a perceptual condition and a memorial condition.
The memorial condition comprised two sessions. In the first session children learned colors for the nine rectangle stimuli. On the initial presentation of the stimulus series, the experimenter showed the colored card and spelled out its name as each rectangle was presented. On subsequent trials the child had to supply the name of the color as each rectangle was presented. After the response, the correct color was shown and called out by the experimenter regardless of the child's answer and while the stimulus rectangle was still being displayed. Order of presentation was irregular and different for each child. Trials were continued until each child reached a 300% overlearning criterion. These learning sessions took 25-40 rain per subject. The child was encouraged to make use of his or her own mnemonic devices to strengthen his or her motivation and facilitate the associations of colors to rectangles.
In addition, an informal warming-up phase preceded the individual teaching ofeach child. Besides a detailed presentation of the to-be-used stimuli and task requirements, this period was taken to establish good rapport between child and experimenter.
After a break of 15 rain the child returned to make his or her ratings of the rectangular stimuli. However, no actual stimuli were presented. Reference rectangles were represented instead by their previously learned colors. Children were told to imagine each stimulus rectangle as the colors were shown and called out in an irregular order and then to estimate its area.
Ratings of area were obtained indirectly, however. The task was to judge how sad or happy a child (of the subject's age and who tikes chocolate) would be with that much chocolate (recall the sad and happy faces mentioned in the previous section, see N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978) . There were two replications of the entire stimulus matrix (in an irregular order) yielding two judgments per stimulus. A small minority of the children went through only a single memorial judgment.
In the perceptual condition the initial warming-up (and practice) session was followed by the judgment session. For these children actual stimulus rectangles were presented, one at a time, for judgment. Again, two pseudorandom replications of the stimulus matrix yielded two pereeptual judgments per stimulus. The method of response evocation was the same as that used in the memorial condition.
Subjects. The subjects were 58 children, evenly divided between the sexesat the ages of 6, 8,and 10years (M= 6.00, 7.58, and 10.40, respectively) . Children at each age were irregularly assigned to either the perceptual or the memorial experimental conditions. There were 10 children in all groups except for the perceptual condition for the 8-yearolds, which comprised 8 subjects only. Children came from families associated in some way with the Lewinsky Teacher's College, Tel-Aviv, and residing in greater Tei-Aviv area. Of those recruited, 6 children failed to grasp the task at hand and were dropped from the experimental sample.
Results and Discussion
Perceptual judgments. Mean perceptual judgments of chocolate quantity are shown in Figure 1 . Each panel presents the factorial plot for one age group. Area estimates are plotted as a function of rectangle height. The parameter is rectangle width: Each contour represents rectangles with a different constant width.
Consider first the results for the 6-year-olds in the left panel: Height and width both have large main effects. The 6-year-olds pay attention to the relevant dimensions in arriving at their global area judgments. In this respect, the present findings replicate those obtained by N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) , Leon (1982) , and Wilkening (1979) for roughly the same age groups. At the same time these results eliminate an explanation based on the Piagetian "centration" effect. However, the most striking feature of this family of functions is their roughly equal spacing in the vertical dimension. The parallel spacing implies an additive, Area = Height + Width integration rule. Thus, although young children utilize all salient cues in the stimulus in arriving at a quantitative area judgment, the perceptual algebra used does not obey the normative multiplying rule expected for this task (e.g., N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978) .
For the 10-year-olds, in the right panel, the data follow the expected multiplying model. Indeed, the most salient characteristic of this family of functions is their tendency to diverge from a common origin at the lower left. There is a systematic change in the number of distance units separating the approximately linear functions from one another. The observed linear fan indicates an Area = Height x Width rule of stimulus integration. The consistent use of a clear Height X Width perceptual composition rule for 1 l-year-old children and over seems to be well founded in current research N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978 ; N. H. Anderson & Weiss, 1971; Leon, 1982; Verge & Bogartz, 1978; Wilkening, 1979) .
The middle panel, for the 8-year-olds, also shows the linear divergence pattern. However, the observed divergence is not as convincing as for the 10-year-olds, which suggests that this set is somewhere in between the additive pattern characterizing the younger subjects and the multiplying pattern characterizing the older ones. N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) and Wilkening (1979) arrived at essentially the same conclusion with their intermediate age groups. Interpretation of response patterns for these groups is a bit more complex because their judgments are seldom fully compatible with any one of the typical integration models (see also Leon, 1982) . Taken as a whole, the present set of patterns probably reflects the gradual transformation of a simple adding integration rule to a perceptually ecological multiplying model in the course of development.
Analyses of variance of the judgments (separate analyses were made for each age group) confirmed the different integration rules drawn from the visual inspection of the graphic displays. For all age groups, main effects for width and height were highly significant. Interaction variance is the critical term to assess, however, because failure of additivity will appear as a significant interaction (N. H. Anderson, 1970 Anderson, , 1974 Anderson, , 1982 . For the 6-year-olds, the data showed a nonsignificant overall interaction, F(4, 36) < 1, substantiating the results of the graphic test of parallelism: linear addition of height and width onto subjective a r e a .
For the 10-year-olds, the Height • Width interaction was highly significant, F(4, 36) = 12.2, p < .01. If the Area = Height • Width model is correct, then this interaction should solely be concentrated in the bilinear component; that is, the residual interaction should be negligible. The bilinear component was indeed significant, accounting for 66.32% of the interaction variance, F(1, 9) = 8. l, p < .05, but the remainder of the interaction reached significance too, F(3, 27) = 4. l, p < .05. However, the significance of the residual interaction may simply be due to a ceiling effect for the largest rectangle (see downward bowing of the top curve). Overall, the multiplying model seems to hold fairly well for the data set of our oldest subjects (although some of the subjects may still be in a transitional stage).
For the 8-year-olds the data showed a significant overall interaction at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level, F(4, 28) = 3.31. Decomposition of this rather small interaction variance into its orthogonal components revealed that 47.1% of it resided in the bilinear component. Neither that component, F(l, 7) = 2.0, nor the residual, F(3, 21) = 1.75, were significant (ps > .05). Although bilinear interaction may serve as a first-order approximation to describe the 8-year-olds' data, the multiplying model is not unequivocally supported by these results. This group seems, therefore, to be in a transitional state in terms of the operative integration rule (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978 ; see also Leon, 1982) . The most striking feature of the memory patterns for all three age groups is their close correspondence to the respective perceptual data. As found in the perceptual condition, there is a marked--although gradual--transition from an initial additive integration rule at age 6 (left panel) to a fully developed normative multiplying model at age 10 (right panel). Estimates based on memory representations of area at each age reveal the same integration properties found with regular perceptual judgments at the corresponding stages of development. Where perceptual judgments evidence additive structures (age 5-6), memorial judgments based on the same set of referent stimuli do too. And when perceptual estimates of area come to obey the normative Height X Width rule (age l 0-l 1 ), the same multiplicative rule holds for imagined rectangles too. Given the different mode of cognitive generation, the evident stability in the shape of the corresponding integration characteristics is quite impressive.
Analyses of variance of the judgments from memory (separate analyses were performed for each age group) confirmed the conclusions drawn from the visual inspection of the graphic displays. Again, for all groups, width and height were highly significant. For the 6-year-olds, the Height • Width interaction did not approach significance, F(4, 36) < l, which supports the visual Area = Height + Width rule observed in the left panel of Figure 2 . Overall interaction for the oldest group was significant, F(4, 36) = 21.75, p < .01. Nearly all of this interaction variance appeared in the Linear X Linear component (accounting for 92.12% of the variance). Moreover, the bilinear component is highly significant, F(l, 9) = 20.04, p < .0 l, whereas the remainder of the interaction is not, F(3, 27) = 1.74, p > .05. The multiplying model seems, perforce, as strong for the memory condition of our oldest group (indeed it is stronger) as for its perceptual counterpart. For the 8-year-olds, overall interaction was also significant at the .05 level, F(4, 36) = 4.76. The Linear x Linear component accounted for 72.5% of the interaction; however, neither it, F(I, 9) = 3.45, nor the residual, F(3, 27) = 1.3 l, reached significance (.05).
Individual analyses. Beyond their value in providing broader validational base to the principle of integration invariance, single-subject analyses enabled us to follow more closely the developmental trend from adding to multiplying. Individual factorial Note. A = addition; M = multiplication; U = undetermined.
plots were inspected and the implied structures were classified as either additive or multiplicative (a small minority of the individual displays could not be decided by this visual method).
The results of this graphical analysis appear in Table 1 . As can be seen from Table 1 , there is a great deal of consistency across the two cognitive modes of subjective area generation: Use of a multiplying rule in perception and memory increases with age. Fisher exact probability tests (Siegel, 1956 ) performed on each of two 2 x 2 contingency tables (age [6, 10] by combination rule, for perception and for memory) both showed significant (p < .01) results.
Statistical analyses conducted on individual data sets support the conclusion drawn from the visual tests. Because most of the children in each condition went through two replications, individual analyses of variance were possible, though, of course, they are limited in power (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978) . In these tests, 6 of 9 children in the 6-year-old perception group showed significant (.05) main effects for both height and width. 5 of 7 children in the memory condition at the same age showed the same effects. For the subjects in the 4 older groups both height and width had significant main effects in virtually all of the analyses (in 28 of 33 appropriate data sets). Detailed examination of the interaction terms further established the pattern of gradual transition from adding to multiplying in both perception and memory. In the perceptual condition, the number of subjects using an adding rule (i.e., with nonsignificant interaction terms) were 5, 2, and 1 for the 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, respectively. The respective frequencies for the memorial conditions were 6, 4, and 0.
Taken together, individual analyses demonstrate that young children combine stimulus dimensions according to different, age-dependent, algebraic rules. At a given age, these rules have the same general form regardless of the mode of cognitive generation (perceptual vs. memorial). In addition, the highly significant main effects obtained with virtually all of the individual data sets show that children based their judgments on both relevant dimensions in perception and memory alike.
Psychophysicalfunctions. As N. H. Anderson (1970 Anderson ( , 1974 has pointed out, given a factorial design of the type used in this study and results consistent with either additivity or bilinearity, in the response domain, the marginal means provide estimates of the internal scale values. Therefore, the marginal means of the area judgments were calculated for the three sizes of rectangle height (by averaging judgments across columns) and for the three (identical) sizes of width (by averaging judgments across the rows of the factorial matrix). Because the row (height) marginal means were virtually identical to the column (width) marginal means in each group, (t < 1, in all cases) these means were averaged over the corresponding (identical) stimulus values. Figure 3 gives these calculated scale values of subjective area as a function of different sizes of stimulus rectangle side. Figure 4 depicts subjective area as a function of physical area. The marginal mean-based psychophysical functions in Figure 3 provide yet another converging set of estimated exponents for area. They also provide parallel illustrations of the changing relations betwen perceptual and memory exponents for area over the ages between 6 and 10.
The fits to the power functions (straight lines in the double logarithmic coordinates) are excellent even though the curves in Figure 3 are based on only three data points (r 2 for both perceptual and memorial conditions were all at least 0.992 for the side functions; respective area r2s for the three age groups were 0.874, 0.956, and 0.988 for the perceptual condition and 0.900, 0.904, and 0.964 for the memorial condition, for the 6-, 8-, and the 10-year-olds). The slopes (exponents of the power functions) are 0.684, 0.857, and 0.998 for the three age groups in the perceptual condition (side functions). The respective exponents for the same age groups in the memory condition were 0.673, 0.731, and 0.762. For the area functions, the respective slopes for the three age groups in the perceptual condition were 0.881,0.997, and 0.998. The corresponding exponents from the memory condition equal 0.837, 0.868, and 0.833.
The pattern of results is similar in both the marginal function ( Figure 3 ) and the area-rating (Figure 4 ) cases. First, there is no simple proportionality between perceived or remembered area and the physical stimulus (except, perhaps, for the 10-yearolds). Most psychophysical relations are mildly compressive with representative exponent in the vicinity of 0.90. Second, although absolute values differ, all perceptual psychophysical functions are steeper than their memorial counterparts for the same ages. Yet closer examination of the results suggests a signifieantly lower memory exponent for the two older groups only: for the 8-year olds, t(l 6) = 2.18, p < .05; for the 10-yearolds, t(18) = 2.83, p < .05. For the 6-year-olds, perceptual and memorial slopes do not differ significantly, t(l 8) = 0.28.
That perceived area is a compressive power function of physical area agrees with previous investigations with adults (see Baird, 1970; . The present results also suggest a compressive psychophysical function for children's judgments of area (although some of the exponents come close to unity). Moreover, the relations uncovered here rest on validated scale values. No comparable psychophysical data on children are available. However, detailed examination of relevant factorial plots presented by Wilkening (1979) and Leon (1982) also reveals a negatively accelerated psychophysical relation (vertical separation between neighboring curves becomes progressively smaller). The nonlinearity is more appreciable, however, with increase in age. The exponents in the order of 0.99 obtained in some of the perceptual groups of the present study are inconsistent with the developmental trend implicit in the mentioned studies; however, the discrepancy may be fortuitous because it has to do with the very restricted data base for deriving the relevant scales. Three data points (in this as well as in the other studies mentioned) are hardly enough to specify the respective relation (see also Algom & Cohen-Raz, 1984 , 1987 W'flkening 1981) . Beyond the indication of the general trend, the absolute slope values reported here should be taken rather
lightly.
The finding ofan attenuated memory exponent for the 8 and 10-year-olds is consistent with those reported for adults by Algore et al. (1985) , , and Kerst and Howard (1978) . The present results do not, however, allow for a clear decision between the rival formulations that have been suggested to account for memorial judgment. Both the reperceptual and the uncertainty hypotheses predict a more compressive memory function for perceptual dimensions characterized by a smaller-than-unity power function exponent like the one used here.
The most striking result emerging from the psyehophysical analyses is the lack of difference between perceptual and memorial psyehophysical functions for the 6-year-olds. Power funelions exponents for these groups have practically the same value regardless of whether judgments are made perceptually or retrieved from memory. At this age, then, perceptual and memorial composition processes act both on practically equivalent sets of implicit values.
Because perceived area and remembered area were both power functions of physical area for all age groups, one scale must be a power function of the other. Figure 5 shows memory estimates as a function of perceptual estimates for the three age groups.
The fits to the power functions are excellent (r2s = 0.986, 0.937 and 0.980 for the 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, respectively). The exponents are 0.939, 0.867, and 0.826 for the three age groups. Note that according to the reperceptual formulation, these values should reflect the original perceptual transduction processes. Although they differ somewhat from the respective perceptual exponents, the overall pattern substantiates our claim for a mildly compressive psychophysical relation characterizing perceived area.
We believe we have successfully extended and N. H. Anderson and Cuneo's (1978) original find- Figure 4 . Perceptual and memorial psychophysical functions for subjective area for three age groups. (Judgments are plotted against physical area and both axes are spaced in logarithmic units.) ings in a number of important ways. This experiment begins to define a set of invariant, age-dependent, stimulus integration features for perceptual and memorial estimates. However, except for the youngest children, the valuation functions differ for the two modes of cognitive operation, the one for memory being more markedly compressive. E x p e r i m e n t 2: Judgements o f Volume Two interesting and theoretically important principles have emerged in the data of Experiment 1. The first and main finding suggested an invariance of the integration rule across perceptual and memory judgments of the same stimuli. The second finding suggested that, for young children, there is additional invariance of the valuation function relating physical magnitude to perceived and remembered magnitude. The following experiments were designed to extend the database to include different sensory domains beyond area judgments. Stimuli in the different experiments were also varied along the number of geometrical dimensions required to define them. These additional experiments provide ample opportunity to reject a general invariance rule hypothesis ifin fact it is false.
The present experiment used three-dimensional solid objects (rectangular cardboard blocks) to obtain both perceptual and memorial judgments of volume.
Method
Stimuli and design. The stimuli were white solid rectangular shapes.
Height, width, and depth were varied in a 2 • 2 x 2 factorial design. The two heights were 2 and 4 cm, the two bases were 3 and 6 era, and the two depth values were 5 and 10 era. A given target stimulus was mounted on the stimulus display approximately 60 cm from the seated subject. The subject always faced the Height X Width two-dimensional plane with the depth dimension perpendicular to him. Eight differently colored circular shapes from those prepared in Experiment I were also used.
The same graphic rating scale from Experiment 1 was used to measure the child's judgments of volume; however, no anchor stimuli were used in this experiment.
Procedure. General procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. The experiment comprised two sessions. In the first session subjects learned to associate colors to each of the eight block stimuli. Methods of stimulus presentation, response evocation and experimenter's feedback were the same as in Experiment 1. Trials were continued until each subject reached a 300% learning criterion. These learning sessions lasted 20-25 min per subject.
Atter a break of 15 min the child returned to make his or her ratings of the solid rectangular stimuli. Children were randomly assigned to either the memorial or the perceptual condition. In the memorial group no actual blocks were presented. Reference stimuli were represented instead by their previously learned colors. Subjects were told to imagine each stimulus block as the colors were shown and called out in an irregular order and then to estimate its volume. In the perceptual condition, the same blocks from the first session were presented again for judgment, one at a time.
Again, ratings of volume were obtained indirectly. The child was told about a little boy or girl who liked chocolate and he or she was to tell how happy the little child would be owning various amounts of chocolate. Instructions and practice (handling of stimuli, warming up, etc.,) in using the rating scale were nearly the same as in Experiment I. The childred judged one replication of the 2 • 2 • 2 design.
Subjects. The subjects were 33 children, about evenly divided between the sexes at the ages of 6 and 10 years. Of the 19 six-year-old children, 9 were randomly assigned to the perceptual condition and 10 to the memory condition. Eight 10-year-olds participated in the perceptual condition and 6 in the memory condition. Children came from families associated in some way with TeI-Aviv's Lewinsky Teacher's College. None of these subjects had taken part in any previous experiment.
Results and Discussion
The two parts of Figure 6 give the vital factorial plots for the perceptual and memorial conditions, respectively. Mean volume ratings are plotted against block height. The parameters are width and depth: each contour represents blocks with a different constant width at different and constant values of depth. Different panels present the results for each age group.
Visually, a completely additive Height + Width + Depth rule should yield (two-member) families of parallel curves in all panels of Figure 6 . Moreover, the vertical separation between ~ny given pair of curves as well as their common slope should cemain largely unchanged across different parameter values (i.e., across neighboring pairs of functions) at each cognitive mode at each age group. A multiplicative Height x Width X Depth rule, on the other hand, requires not only distinct nonparallelism but also notable changes in the magnitude of the vertical separation between pairs of functions across neighboring parameter values (or adjacent panels).
The perceptual data for the 6-year-olds conform fairly well to an overall additive Volume = Height + Width + Depth model. Virtually all pairs of functions are separated from one another by roughly equal amounts in the vertical dimension. This parallel spacing implies an additive mode of concatenating the values of the three geometric dimensions onto a final integrated volume response. The additive model holds equally well for the memory data of the younger children. It is also clear by inspection that all three dimensions have large main effects. Thus, even the 6-year-olds pay attention to all relevant dimensions in arriving at their global volume judgments. Therefore, the present results yield yet another set of data incompatible with the Piagetian "centration" interpretation.
For the l O-year-olds, despite an overall impression of parallelism, the graphical presentation reveals a notable change in magnitude of the vertical separation between the pairs ofcurves representing the two width sizes at the two values of depth. This may point toward a significant Width x Depth interaction. Interestingly enough, this interaction is also evident in the memory data of the lO-year-olds. Beyond this violation, however, an additive rule of combination seems to fit both perceptual and memory data sets quite well. Overall then, the data for the older children can be characterized by a compound adding-multiplying model. However, the most striking feature of the present results taken together comes from a systematic comparison of judgments produced under the two cognitive conditions. Inspection of Figure 6 reveals essentially the same pattern of results. A single integration function for each age appears throughout all portions of the data. In the case of volume, both the perceptual and the memorial judgments evidence a rather moderate developmental change within the span of ages tested in this experiment. Statistical analyses support the visual conclusions. An additive rule of composition predicts nonsignificance of all interactions. The multiplicative model, on the other hand, predicts significance of the bilinear components of all interactions. As Table 2 reveals, the critical Height • Width • Depth interaction is in no case significant. The lack of interaction throughout all subsets of the present data for the 6-year-olds supports the additive rule of integration observed in the respective panels of Figure 6 . For the 10-year-olds, however, the Width • Depth interaction is significant in both perceptual and memory conditions, substantiating statistically the appearance of a compound Volume = Width • Depth + Height rule for this age.
The Volume = Height + Width + Depth pattern discovered here for the 6-year-olds and the compound adding-multiplying rule characterizing the data for the 10-year-olds are interesting in several respects. First, a three-dimensional representation of the physical stimulus in both perception and memory seems similar for the younger and older children. Thus, even the younper child clearly is attentive to all necessary dimensions defining the stimulus and hence relevant to the judgmental task at hand. Second, the uncovered adding-multiplying rule for the 10-yearolds is puzzling because simple perception of the volume should produce the veridical Height • Width • Depth rule. Failure of the normative multiplying pattern to appear (at least for the judgments of the older children) is surprising from a developmental perspective. Third, and most important for the present purposes, is the observed across-representation invariance of the integration processes involved. Baird (1970) has noted the paucity of experimental research on visual volume judgments. Fifteen years after that observation, relevant research is still rare. Yet a recent study by Halford, Brown, and Thompson (1986) found that children aged 7 to 10 years could accurately judge volume by integrating width, depth, and height in a multiplicative fashion. Previously, Wilkening (1980) reported that although his 8-and 9-year-old subjects used a multiplicative rule for the integration of height and diameter in judgments of volume of cones, the younger 5-and 6-year-old children used an additive mode of integration. Although the present findings are generally (though not fully) compatible with those reported by Wilkening for both age groups, they are clearly at odds with those reported by Halford et al. Halford and his coworkers (as well as Wilkening before) had subjects judge volume by setting a marker on a vertical tube labeled with a physical cubic centimeter scale. Their stimuli ineluded both cubic and rectangular shapes. Whether these procedural differences are sufficient to account for the discrepant findings is still unclear.
The present results point toward the possibility of a long and quite gradual transition during which an initial additive structure is finally altered to the normative, physical, multiplicative mode of integration. The significant two-way interactions in the data of the 10-year-olds probably signal the first changes toward the full development of the veridical multiplying integration model. The number of geometrical dimensions required to define a target is likely to be correlated with the length of the developmental track needed to acquire the correct integration function for that target. For area, it might be recalled, the veridical multiplying structure did clearly appear by the age of 10.
The main burden of this experiment was extraction of the relevant metric structures, not specification of psychophysical relations. The need to keep the number of experimental stimuli within a reasonably small limit (in order to enable their memorization by even young children) dictated the choice of only dichotomic values for all three geometric variables. Hence, no marginal functions could be calculated in the present case. Still, the dichtomic values for each dimension yielded three different volume stimuli spreading over a range of8:1 between the biggest and smallest shapes. Unfortunately, the power fits attempted to the respective subjective volume versus physical volume functions proved quite unsatisfactory (r 2 < 0.82 for all conditions). Of course, three data points are hardly enough to determine the functional relations involved, especially with a rather restricted stimulus range (R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, , 1973 . Average exponent was 0.93. Although we believe this result to be spurious (we give it for illustration), it seems clear that real power function exponents for volume judgments, in perception as well as from memory, are moderately compressive. Their exact parametric determination, and particularly, specification of the memory-percept relations, has yet to be accomplished. Ekman and Junge (1961) , using a comparable range of values, reported a power function exponent in the order of 1.01. Other studies (e.g., M. Teghtsoonian, 1965; Ekman, Lindmann, & William-Olsson, 1961 ; see also Baird, 1970 , for a review of a rather sparse literature) typically yielded much lower exponents in the order of 0.60--0.70. More recently, reported exponents of 0.729 and 0.527, respectively, for perceptual and memorial judgments of the volume of spherical ob-jeers. Baird concluded his review by noting an apparent correlation between dimensionality of target stimulus and the magnitude of the relevant psychophysical power function exponent. Thus, "length is about 1.0, area about 0.80, and volume about 0.60" (p. 63).
The primary contribution of this experiment is to demonstrate that integration rule invariance across perception and memory of a given set of stimuli is a general and valid phenomenon. Results of Experiment 1 on area and of Experiment 2 on volume verify and generalize the equivalence of the cognitive algebra used in perception and memory, across different rules of integration and tmget-stimulus dimensionality. Would an across-representation invariance law prevail with still another type of stimulus coupled with a yet untapped rule of integration?
Experiment 3: Judgments of Liquid Quantity According to the Piagetian approach, children in the preoperational stage given nonconservational responses in a variety of rather well-known conservation tests. One of the most famous and extensively used of these tests requires the child to judge the equality of liquid quantities in glasses of differing width at different heights. N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) examined judgments of liquid quantity within the framework of a full Liquid Height X Glass Diameter factorial design. Their 5-year-old subjects indeed exhibited a height-only rule, in accordance with the Piagetian "centration" prediction (i.e., children are unable to "decenter" and to take account of other relevant variables). Although N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) have seriously questioned the viability of a general sense centration interpretation for these data (as do the results of Experiments 1 and 2 in this study), nonetheless a height-only rule for judging the amount of liquid inside glass containers proved a fairly stable result. Regardless of the correct interpretation, the liquid in glass task is important for the present purposes in providing yet another perception-memory equivalence test on a hitherto unresearched rule of integration.
Method
Stimuli and design. A 3 X 2 design was used with three sizes of glasses and two levels of liquid in the glasses. The glasses had inside diameters of 4.5, 5.5, and 7.0 cm and contained different color familiar beverages to heights of 2.5 and 7.5 cm. The beverages used were chosen for familiarity and were different colors: cola, orange juice, grapefruit juice, grape juice, milk, and cocoa. Although glass height was not the same for the three glasses, it correlated with neither glass diameter nor liquid height. Fortunately, N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) have demonstrated that beaker height has no effect on liquid judgments (even in a ease where glass height was confounded with glass diameter).
Procedure. The general procedure was the same as in previous experiments. The perceptual condition roughly replicated similar experiments reported in N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) . At the initial session, the child was presented with one glass at a time, learning its content with experimenter's help. At a later stage the child supplied the beverage name as each glass was shown. The session continued until a 300% overlearning criterion was reached. Given the familiarity with the beverages (serving as a potent mnemonic device) and the fact that only six stimuli were used, these learning sessions were considerably shorter than their counterparts in previous experiments. They took 10-15 min per child.
After a short break of approximately 15 rain, the child was told about a tittle boy or girl who was thirsty and then judged how happy the little boy or girl would be with given amounts of drinks (which he or she liked) by using the face scale of Experiments 1 and 2. The child made his or her ratings of liquid volumes, one at a time, as each glass from the learning session was presented for judgrnent. In the memorial condition, following the initial learning session and a short break, subjects made their vohime judgments in the absence of the original liquid stimuli. Liquid quantity was represented instead by the name of the appropriate beverage content. The child gave his judgment as each beverage was called out by the experimenter. Order of presentation and content height were randomized for each child at both conditions. Subjects. Subjects were 12 5-and 6-year-old children. Half of the children served in the memory condition and half in the perceptual condition. None had participated in any previous experiment.
Results and Discussion
Mean judgments of liquid quantity are shown in Figure 7 . Each panel represents the factorial plot for one cognitive condition as a function of glass diameter and liquid height.
Consider first the results from the perceptual condition in the left panel. The upward slope of the curves reflects a strong and probably significant effect of liquid height. The three curves do not, however, appear separated from each other in the vertical dimension. Glass diameter does not, perforce, have an appreciable effect on the present volume judgments. Visually, then, this age group clearly exhibits a height-only rule.
Analysis of variance showed a significant liquid height effect, F(l, 10) = 26.68, p < .01. Neither glass diameter, F(2, 10) = 2.83, p > .05, nor the interaction (F < l) was significant. The results of the statistical analysis agree with the height-only pattern noted in the left panel of Figure 7 . Overall, then, these results imply that judgments of liquid quantity in glasses by young children follow a height-only rule. Our perceptual results replicate those originally reported by Anderson and Cuneo (1978) for the same type of judgments for roughly the same age group.
The novel data of this experiment appear in the right panel of Figure 7 . The perceptual data followed the usual height-only pattern, as do the data for the memorial judgments in the right panel. There seems to be little or no difference between the two kinds of judgments. It would appear, therefore, that the heightonly rule is a fairly consistent phenomenon in 6-year-old children's judgments of liquid quantity, regardless of the mode of cognitive generation. Remembered quantities of drinks in glass containers obey the same rule of stimulus integration as do perceived amounts.
Statistical analysis for judgments made from memory showed a significant liquid height effect, F(l, l 0) = 18. l, p < .0 l, verifying the visual inspection of Fignre 7. As in perception, neither glass diameter, F(2, 10) = 1.50, p > .05, nor the interaction (F < I) was significant for the memorial judgments as well. Taken together, the data of Experiment 3 again confirm the prediction of a tingle, task-dependent rule of stimulus integration for perception and memory.
Again, the correct interpretation for the present unidimen- sional, height-only rule need not concern us here. Whether it is peculiar to just one situation, namely, liquids inside glasses (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978) or is indicative of a general tendency of young (preoperational?) children to attend to some single aspect of the stimulus (Flavell, 1963 ) is a question for developmental theorists. For the present purposes, the most striking outcome of the work reported in Experiments 1-3 is the steady accumulation of evidence that, under various conditions, perception and memory follow the same simple algebraic models. Experiments 2 and 3 were specially designed to provide crosstask and cross-domain validation for the cognitive equivalence principle relating to perceptual and memory judgments for given sets of stimuli. However, the data of Experiment 1 implied another (though restricted) invariance principle for the mapping of internal scale values onto physical values in memory and perception. Although psychophysical functions for perception and memory clearly differed for the older 10-year-old subjects (in a way reminiscent of adults and compatible with existing theories of memory psychophysics), for the younger children they were practically indistinguishable.
The credibility of this further cognitive invariance property must depend on the degree of accuracy with which it applies to different sets of data. A further and final experiment was designed to evaluate this.
Experiment 4: Judgments o f Linear Extent
The main purpose of this experiment was simply to check that the scale-value invariance pattern for 6-year-otds in Experiment I is reliable across different stimulus domains and experimental conditions. Accordingly, the present experiment used a traditional, unifactor, psychophysical scaling design for visual extent judgments. The stimuli were different length pieces of chocolate cut from standard chocolate products at a constant (small) width. The same rating scale from Experiments 1-3 was used for the present magnitude judgments, How perceived length grows as a function of physical extent has been well documented (for a review, see Baird, 1970) . The exponent of the power function relating perceived length to physical length provides an index of the rate of growth. The majority of reported exponents are around 1.0, implying a veridical perception, although deviations from unity are found occasionally (Eisler, 1963; Stevens & Galanter, 1957) . However, the primary concern of this experiment is not exponent magnitude per se, but rather exponent relation for perceptual and memorial judgments at different stages of development. Do memory psychophysical functions significantly depart from their perceptual counterparts only at around l0 years of age and beyond?
M e t h o d
Stimuli and design. Standard chocolate bars of approximately 20 • 10 cm from the stores (Elite products) were used for stimulus construction. The small square blocks (of approximately 1.25 • 1.25 cm) that stick out on the surface served as our unit of measurement. Bars I block wide and !, 2, 4, and 8 blocks long were cut from the original standard products. Four colored circular shapes from those prepared in Experiment I were also used.
Procedure. In a preliminary learning session, each child was taught to associate colors to the chocolate stimuli (to a 300% overlearning criterion). These sessions lasted 10-20 min (depending on age) per child. Then, subjects were randomly assigned to either a perceptual or a memorial judgment condition.
In the perceptual condition, children were presented with the chocolate bars one at a time and were instructed to judge each in terms of "amount to eat:' In the memorial condition, original bars of chocolate were symbolically represented by appropriate colors; otherwise, instructions were identical. In both learning and perceptual judgment sessions, chocolate bar stimuli were presented with subjects facing their smooth side (i.e., the subblocks were unseen to prevent basing judgments on counting the number of blocks). The same response scale from Experiments 1-3 was used. Each child gave a single judgment per stimulus.
Subjects. The subjects were 40 children, about evenly divided between the sexes, in two age groups: 5-6 years and 10-11 years. Ten subjects from each age group participated in both the perceptual and memorial conditions.
Results and Discussion
Group results are shown in Figure 8 , where log judgment is plotted as a function of log physical extent for the two conditions at each age group. Power functions at both conditions and age groups provided excellent fit to the data, with r 2 values not going below .975. Figure 8 depicts the age-dependent nature of exponent relation for perception and memory previously noted in Experiment 1. The exponents were determined by finding the slope of the line of best fit for each condition at each age by the method of least squares.
There is a clear increase in memory-percept slope difference with increase in age. For the 6-year-olds in the left panel, the subjective length-objective length functions for perception and memory have similar slopes. For the 10-year-olds in the right panel, however, a clear difference exists with a notably steeper slope for the perceptual judgment condition. In fact, visually, the data for the 10-year-olds replicate similar memory-percept relations found in the literature for adults and for 10-or I l-year-old subjects (Experiment l).
Statistically, for the 6-year-olds, exponents were I. l I (r 2 = .994) and 1.227 (r 2 = .975) for perception and memory, respectively. For the 10-year-olds, perceptual judgments yielded ~a power function exponent of 1.303 (r 2 = .981), whereas judgments made from memory resulted in an exponent of 0.820 (r 2 = .598). The difference in exponent magnitude between perception and memory at the age of l0 is more than four times the respective difference for the 6-year-olds. These data thus demonstrate a clear and orderly effect of cognitive condition (perception vs. memory) on the exponent of the psychophysical power function for 10-year-olds (and beyond), but not for the younger 6-year-old subjects.
Several aspects of the data deserve comment. First, although 1.0 is the prototypical exponent value for visual extent judgments, there is variation above and below this value in empirical studies. One summary of nine studies by Baird (1970, p. 42) yielded a spread of exponent between I. 16 and 0.87. Another summary of 11 other studies (Baird, 1970, p. 104 ) gave a range of values between 1.21 and 0.32. Recently reported exponents of 0.967 and 0.703 for perception and memory, respectively. Kerst and Howard (1978) , however, found the more traditional values of 1.04 and 1.08, respectively, for perception and memory. Although the present values may reflect some pecularities of our subjects or experimental conditions, by no means are they new or especially startling. Of course, precise, parametric determination of the psychophysical function for visual length would need a careful, specially designed psychophysical investigation. Exponent magnitudes are not our primary concern here; their order is.
Second, despite the foregoing discussion, the absolute values derived here for the signficantly differing exponents for the 10-year-olds may bear on theoretical issues. According to the reperceptual hypothesis, if the perceptual function (bR) is expansive as in the present case (bR = 1.303) the memory exponent (bM) ought to be potentiated (should equal bM = bR 2 = 1.3032 = 1.698) rather than attenuated as happened here (bu = 0.820). The present results yield support for the rival uncertainty formulation, and they contrast with the results of the only other relevant study in this range (Kerst & Howard, 1978, Experiment 3) . The two studies differ, however, in many important details, notably, in type of stimulqs and response measures used. So, a direct comparison is questionable, especially as Kerst and Howard had adult subjects only.
Not only was a significant slope effect absent in the data of the younger children, but also their perceptual and memorial functions had similar intercept values (a = 0.270 and 0.281, respectively, for perception and memory). Again, a considerably greater intercept difference characterized the 10-year-olds' data (a = 0.154 and 0.472 for perception and memory, respectively).
Overall, then, the results of Experiment 4 yield support for the notion of a single set of internal scale values for perception and memory used by 5-and 6-year-old children. Only at a later stage of development do these two types of cognitive representation undergo a process of differentiation that results in discriminably different psychophysical functions. Admittedly, however; the empirical basis for this claim is still weaker than the one relating to a condition-invariant metric structure.
General Discussion
Different Types of Cognitive Algebra in Children's Processing of Area
The discovery of across-mode invariance for the form of the operative composition rule in children's judgments of area coheres with and extends our understanding of several related cognitive phenomena. The perceptual results suggest that young children combine stimulus dimensions according to algebraic rules that undergo qualitative changes between the ages of 6 and 10. The predominant perceptual integration rule used by the 6-year-olds was the Area = Height + Width model. Then, after a long transition period (the nature of which is still largely unknown or speculative; e.g., N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Leon, 1982; Wilkening, 1980 ) the veridical multiplicative pattern clearly appeared at around 10 years.
9 The highly significant main effects obtained in all age groups for width and height show that children based their ratings of area on both aspects. The results are clearly at odds with the Piagetian "centration" idea that implies a tendency of the preoperational child to attend to only a single aspect of the stimulus. Beyond the valuable replication of previous findings, (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Leon, 1982; Verge & Bogartz, 1978; Wilkening, 1979 Wilkening, , 1980 these data served as the standard perceptual models compared in the present study to models of subjective area derived under respective memorial conditions. Our rationale went as follows: If subjects remember rectangles according to rules of mental construction comparable to those used when the same rectangles are perceived, the invariance idea suggested by should gain considerable support.
The memorial results could hardly have been clearer. Imaginary rectangles were constructed mentally according to exactly the same composition principles as perceived rectangles were.
Where, in the course of development, perceptual algebra changes, so too does the corresponding memorial algebra. This percepto-memorial constancy is operative regardless of the specific rule that the original perceptual composition assumes.
Cognitive Algebra in Children "s Processing of Solid and Liquid Quantity
These further results, obtained with different stimulus types and governed by different rules of integration, resemble those obtained for area in showing insensitivity to mode of cognitive production. Rules of construction underlying remembered volumes and the ones generating remembered quantities of drinks inside glasses exactly followed their respective perceptual principles of composition. The latter were additive or additive-multiplieative in one case and unidimensional in the other. Yet in both cases perceptual composition imposed tight constraints on parallel memorial composition, yielding essentially identical strategies of mental construction.
For judgments of volume, the present results suggest a probably longer and more gradually changing developmental track than is the case for area. Even young children perceive that three geometrical dimensions are essential in determining the size of the target. They clearly utilize all relevant quantitative cues, thereby demonstrating the existence of a general metric sense at this age. However, not even by the age of 10 does component information combine according to the physical Height • Width x Depth rule. Target dimensionality is probably correlated with the developmental stage at which the correct quantitative percept appears.
Judgments of liquid in glass by 6-year-olds were the only ones exhibiting unifactor response production. Although this result is expected from Piagetian theory of centration, it can also be explained as at transfer from daily drinking experience limited solely to this particular stimulus setting (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978) . In fact, all other experimental conditions in this study demonstrate quite sophisticated multivariate cognitive strategies.
However, the main point of the present study is not to specify the form of integration rule but rather to examine the coherence (or its absence) between respective perception-memory pairs of data sets. The present set of experiments allowed for six independent perception-memory comparisons in terms of the operative integration rule (same vs. different). In all cases a single form of integration underlied respective perceptual and memory-based sets of judgments. Chance probability for this result is approximately 1.5%. If we combine the results of the present experiments with two comparable conditions from A1-gom et al. (1985) we have eight, pair-wise, memory-perception comparisons, differing across subjects, stimulus domain, type of response, and composition rule. Yet all yield similar metric structures for respective perceptual and memorial judgments regardless of speeific form, with a chance probability of 0.0039. The evidence for a general-purpose cognitive rule of across representation invariance is strong.
Perceptual and Memorial Psychophysical Functions
The additive, multiplicative, and unifactor algebraic rules found throughout the perceptual and memorial conditions al-low derivation of validated psychophysical functions as well (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984; Algom et ai., 1985; N. H. Anderson, 1970 N. H. Anderson, , 1974 N. H. Anderson, , 1981 N. H. Anderson, , 1982 . The present results indicated compressive psychophysical power functions for both perceived and remembered area or for either of its definitional components (however, some deviations are present; the exponent in the order of 0.988 obtained for the perceptual judgments of the 10-year-olds can hardly be taken to describe a compressive function). In accord with the predictions of both existing theories of memorial magnitude judgment, memorial functions were markedly more nonlinear than their perceptual counterparts, except for the youngest group (the 6-year-olds). The 8-year-olds and the 10-year-olds acted in their memory constructions on subjective scale values that were nonlinearly related to the scale values operative in their perceptual judgments. In that respect these older children behave the same way adults do (AIgom et al., 1985) .
For visual length of chocolate bars, the average power function exponent across conditions was 1.11, a value that is quite but not fully consistent with the majority values reported in the literature. In that experiment, however, an expansive perceptual exponent was followed by a compressive memory exponent (for 10-year-olds). This result is compatible with the uncertainty hypothesis for memorial magnitude judgments but contrasts with the rival reperceptual formulation. Clearly, further specially designed experiments are needed to decide between the two classes of explanation.
An important, though largely unexpected, outcome concerns the comparison between perceptual and memorial functions for the 6-year-olds. In contrast to the respective results for the older children as well as for adults, for these young children the two functions had very close exponents. We suggest, therefore, that children of 5 or 6 years base their memorial judgments on practically the same set of subjective scale values as that underlying their perceptual judgments. Although this hypothesis is supported by the better part of the present set of data, it is clearly in need of more definitive experimental examination.
Implications for Mental Representation
The present findings offer preliminary support for the socalled analog representation theory of mental imagery (e.g., J. R. Anderson, 1978; Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Finke, 1980; Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn et al., 1978; Kosslyn, Reiser, Farah, & Fliegel, 1983; Moyer, 1973; Paivio, 1975 Paivio, , 1978 Shepard & Feng, 1972; Shepard & Metzler, 1971 ; see also Algom & Lewin, 1982; Algom & Singer, 1985; Shepard, 1984) . The general finding of the cited studies is replicated with increased clarity in the present experiments. The notion that visual imagery is encoded in spatial terms and processed in quasiperceptual ways has gained support. The possibility that the results are produced by explicit mental calculations (e.g., Baird, 1970; Butler & Overshiner, 1983; Stevens & Guirao, 1963; M. Teghtsoonian, 1965 )---an artifactual explanation often advanced for adults' datamhas much less power to explain the present set of results. Children's mastery of the numerical and computational concepts necessary for the relevant calculations seems inadequate, at least for the younger groups (but see Leon, 1982) .
The 6-year-olds tested in the present series of experiments did not know the mathematical formula for area and for volume from school or otherwise. In addition, all subjects gave rather fast and spontaneous responses for all stimuli, making conscious calculation-based judgments highly unlikely. Although explicit mental calculations cannot completely be ruled out as a theoretical possibility, a relatively direct perceptual-cognitive responding process is the more natural explanation for the present case (see also Wilkening, 1980, p. 61) .
Although the present factorial scheme bypasses many of the shortcomings of earlier unifactor designs with respect to drawing process-based cognitive conclusions, it still leaves undetermined the psychological mechanisms producing the unifactor, additive, or multiplicative structures. The functional measurement approach is best considered as putting necessary constraints on any suggestion for particular mental representation. In the present case, these constraints are tight enough to enable one to reject certain classes of explanations, such as the Piagetian centration hypothesis for the 6-year-olds' judgments or N. H. Anderson and Cuneo's (1978) repeated-addition hypothesis for the multiplicative structure produced by the 10-yearolds (note the emergence of compressive psychophysical functions; see also Wilkening, 1979) . For the perceptual results of the 10-year-olds, however, one cannot rule out a repeated addition hypothesis as their psychophysical data are characterized by a power function exponent of 0.988. The exact nature of the underlying mechanisms producing the different metric structures is still somewhat of a puzzle. Perhaps the best solution is to use the factorial design hierarchically across successive processing stages of a given stimulus in order to arrive at a comprehensive theoretical framework (see Algom &Marks, 1984; Marks, 1979) .
Developmental Perspectives
The present results suggest that children's imagery (at least that large part called memory images: e.g., Algom & Lewin, 1976 Horowitz, 1970; Richardson, 1969) is lawfully related to the physical objects surrounding them (though the laws are subject to change). Moreover, their perceptual organization and capacities pose fight constraints on their inner world of imagery. In a strict metric sense, then, no two cognitive worlds are available for children, one perceptual and reality oriented, the other imaginal and detached from reality. Far from being detached, children's world of make-believe strictly obeys the very rules used in constructing their physically bound perceptual world.
As mentioned in the introduction, the term second-order isomorphism was coined by Shepard to point to an important property of mental (i.e., memorial or imaginal) operations, namely, their tendency to mirror the functional relations existing in the reference physical stimuli. The present study provides evidence for a second-order isomorphism between internal and physical relations by demonstrating a perceptual mode of stimulus integration in memory for older children. However, for the 6-year-olds, one can speak ofafirst-order isomorphism between physical and mental relations in that, at this age, the cognitive algebra and the valuation operation both assume the same form in perception and memory. The developmental transition examined in the present series of experiments involves changes in the so-called geometrical "deep structure" (Shepard, 1981) , that at least in one common case, assume a form of a shift from addition toward multiplication of stimulus components. Put in an even wider context, the present functional methodology may tap the cognitive processes designated metaphorically by Shepard (1984) as resonant kinematics. Both approaches stress the comprehensive and long-enduring constraints posed by the surrounding environment on internal representation. Shepard's methodology applies to uncovering continuous variations, whereas the present method may he better suited to following discrete, though parametrically describable, changes.
